Regional climate change and national responsibilities by Hansen, James E. & Sato, Makiko H.
Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (2016) 034009 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/034009
LETTER
Regional climate change and national responsibilities
JamesHansen andMakiko Sato
Climate Science, Awareness and Solutions, ColumbiaUniversity Earth Institute, NewYork,NY 10115,USA
E-mail: jeh1@columbia.edu
Keywords:migration, global warming, regional climate, climate policy, fossil fuels
Abstract
Global warming over the past several decades is now large enough that regional climate change is
emerging above the noise of natural variability, especially in the summer atmiddle latitudes and year-
round at low latitudes. Despite the smallmagnitude of warming relative toweatherfluctuations,
effects of thewarming already have notable social and economic impacts. Global warming of 2 °C
relative to preindustrial would shift the ‘bell curve’ defining temperature anomalies a factor of three
larger than observed changes since themiddle of the 20th century, with highly deleterious
consequences. There is striking incongruity between the global distribution of nations principally
responsible for fossil fuel CO2 emissions, known to be themain cause of climate change, and the
regions suffering the greatest consequences from thewarming, a fact with substantial implications for
global energy and climate policies.
Global warming since preindustrial time, barely 1 °C,
is small compared toweather fluctuations, yet seasonal
mean temperature anomalies in most land areas are
now large enough to noticeably load the ‘climate dice’.
The public should notice that climate is changing,
because warming of recent decades has shifted the ‘bell
curve’ describing seasonal mean local temperature
anomalies over the summer hemisphere by about one
standard deviation (Hansen et al 2012). What were
once unusually warm conditions now occur more
frequently, and the most extreme warm events now
are more extreme than before. However, the magni-
tude of change varies around the globe.
Here we update the hemispheric analysis and illus-
trate regional changes, each shown by the bell curve
for the frequency of occurrence of a given seasonal
mean temperature anomaly relative to a climatological
(base) period, 1951–1980, which largely preceded the
rapid global warming trend of the past four decades.
Results differ little if we use a longer base period,
1931–1980 (Hansen et al 2013a). The rationale for the
bell curve presentation is that it provides a simple clear
indication of significant change.
We find that recent warming during summer in
arid and semi-arid subtropical regions such as the
Mediterranean andMiddle East is at least two standard
deviations, far exceeding natural variability. Warming
is similarly large in all seasons in the tropics. Large low
latitude warming has been reported earlier by Diffen-
baugh and Scherer (2011) and Mahlstein et al
(2011, 2012). Added to natural subtropical aridity and
high temperatures at low latitudes, this large warming
contributes to drought intensification in the sub-
tropics andmakes living andworking conditionsmore
difficult in low latitudes. We will note works suggest-
ing that higher temperatures affect economic produc-
tion, contribute to human health problems, and tend
to increase human conflict, perhaps increasing pres-
sures for migration, but mainly we point to the need
for research on these topics. In contrast, we can be
quantitative in updating national responsibilities for
fossil fuel CO2 emissions, which are known to be the
principal cause of global warming.
In updating results for Northern and Southern
Hemisphere land areas (figure 1) we break the 66-year
period 1950–2015 into six 11 year periods, so the peri-
ods have equal statistical significance. For clarity not
all 11 year periods are included in our figures. Warm-
ing is larger in winter than in summer (Hansen
et al 2010, IPCC 2013), but year-to-year temperature
variability is much larger in winter (see global maps of
interannual standard deviation of seasonal mean
temperature in figure 2 of Hansen et al 2012). Thus the
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anomalies in units of standard deviation) is larger in
summer than in winter (figure 1), implying that cli-
mate change is easier to detect in summer than in win-
ter. However, seasonal variation of the bell curve shift
(figure 1) is small in the Southern Hemisphere,
because a large fraction of Southern Hemisphere land
is at low latitudes where seasonal change is small and
because the dominance of ocean area in the Southern
Hemispheremoderates seasonal change.
We calculate the ‘shift’ and the ‘width’ of the bell
curve for each 11 year period relative to the 1951–1980
base period by finding the μ and σ yielding best least-
mean-square fit of the data to
xexp 2 2 .2 2[ ( – ) ] [ ( )]m s s p- / /
The ‘shift’ for any 11 year period is the difference
between the seasonal mean temperature during that
11 year period and the climatology period
(1951–1980) in units of the standard deviation of
seasonal mean temperature during 1951–1980. The
‘width’ is the ratio of the standard deviation in the 11
year period and in 1951–1980. The shift and width for
the 2005–2015 bell curves are given in the upper right
hand corner of the graphs.
Shift of seasonal mean temperature in units of
standard deviation usefully characterizes local climate
change, as it measures change relative to the range of
conditions that humans and other species at that locale
are adapted to. Global temperature is now probably
slightly above the prior Holocene maximum (Hansen
et al 2013b), and despite regional Holocene variability
(Mayewski et al 2004), in most regions further warm-
ing will take temperature to levels not experienced
since at least the prior interglacial, more than 100 000
years ago. A question of interest is thus how large the
temperature change is relative to the historic varia-
bility at that location.
The bell curve width increases with global warm-
ing and the curve tends to become slightly asymmetric
with an increasingly long tail on the ‘hot’ side. The bell
curve would become a near-symmetric normal dis-
tribution if we defined anomalies relative to the most
recent decades rather than 1951–1980 (Rhines and
Huybers 2013, Hansen et al 2013c), but it is appro-
priate to define anomalies relative to the time before
the sharpwarming trend for reasons given above.
Our analysis is of seasonal mean temperature, but
emergence from noise of seasonal and daily extremes
are tightly coupled, with seasonal change preceding
daily change (King et al 2015). Our analysis (figure 1)
agrees with the conclusion of Seneviratne et al (2014)
and Sillmann et al (2014) that the trend toward
increasingly hot extremes has continued in the most
recent decade, despite evidence of a slowdown or hia-
tus in global surface warming (Meehl et al 2011,
IPCC 2013). Existence of a global warming hiatus has
also been questioned (Karl et al 2015).
Now we examine the bell curve changes in various
geographical regions (figure 2). The curves become
‘noiser’ as the regions becomes smaller, yet the effect
of warming is easily discernable.
The summer bell curves for the United States and
(North and Central) Europe are shiftedmore than one
standard deviation (1σ), while the shift in the winter is
only about half of a standard deviation. The shift in
summer is enough to increase the frequency of sum-
mers warmer than +2σ from less than 1% to greater
than 10%. The perceptive public may be able to notice
this degree of change, but there is a geographical varia-
tion of the signal within the United States, as we will
Figure 1. Frequency of occurrence of local temperature anomalies (relative to 1951–1980mean) divided by local standard deviation
(horizontal axis) for land areas shown onmap. Area under each curve is unity. Numbers above themaps are percent of the globe
covered by the selected region. ‘Shift’ and ‘width’ refer to the dashed curve fit to 2005–2015 data and are relative to the 1951–1980 base
period (see text).
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discuss. The bell curve shift in winter is too small to be
easily noticed. The changes in Europe are only slightly
larger than those in theUnited States.
The bell curve shifts are larger in China and India,
being about one and one-half standard deviations in
summer and one standard deviation in winter. The
area that we employed for the India region includes
the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka, thus reducing the noise by achieving an area
of about 0.7% of the globe. These bell curve shifts
should be noticeable and have practical effects, which
wewill discuss.
This climate change signal, measured in units of
the normal variability, becomes even stronger at lower
latitudes, as we move well into the subtropics and tro-
pics (figure 3). The summer bell curve shift is+2.4σ in
the Mediterranean and Middle East region, which
means that almost every summer is warmer than aver-
age conditions in 1951–1980 andmost summers are at
least +2σ relative to the climate of 50 years earlier.
Warming in the Sahara and Sahel is similar to that in
the Mediterraen and Middle East, although noisier
because ofmore limited data.
South-East Asia and the African Rainforest, moist
tropical regions, have bell curve shifts toward warmer
temperatures exceeding +2σ in June–July–August,
i.e., a warming signal as large as the shift in the sub-
tropical dry belt and desert.Moreover the shift in these
tropical regions is as large or almost as large in
the other seasons, as shown for December–January–
February (figure 3).
We do not illustrate the results for the three indivi-
dual regions in the Southern Hemisphere (Australia,
South America and the southern part of Africa)
because we find the bell curves and their shifts for all
three regions are very similar to those for the three
areas together. The results for these areas are thus ade-
quately described by the lower half offigure 1.
Global warming that leads to the large shift of the
regional bell curves has been definitively associated
Figure 2. Shifting bell curves that define the frequency of local temperature anomalies relative to the 1951–1980 base period for four
regions, with definitions and nomenclature as infigure 1.
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with increasing atmospheric greenhouse gases
(GHGs), principally CO2 from fossil fuel burning (e.g.,
IPCC 2013, Hansen et al 2013b). Although global
warming is only approaching 1 °C, the regional bell
curves reveal that the warming signal has emphatically
emerged on regional scales. The conclusion that the
signal should emerge first at low latitudes in summer
was reached already by Diffenbaugh and Scherer
(2011) andMahlstein et al (2011, 2012).
Regional bell curves, in addition to being ‘noisy’
because of small areas, are affected more by dynamical
phenomena such as the El Niño/Southern Oscillation
(Rasmusson and Wallace 1983) and North Atlantic
Oscillation (Hurrell 1995). Thus decade-to-decade
shifting of the bell curve is more irregular for regions
than for a hemisphere. For this reason we emphasize
total change from the base period to the most recent
decade,minimizing the effect of regional dynamics.
Insight is provided by global maps of the temper-
ature change that gives rise to the shifting bell curves.
The temperature data that we employ is NASA/GISS
surface temperature analysis (Hansen et al 2010) over
land areas at 250 km resolution (figure 4). This analy-
sis is based on the latest GHCN (Global Historical Cli-
matology Network) data obtained from NOAA,
GHCN version 3.3.0. We note that GHCN land data
have been very stable in sucessive updates, and thus
the updates do not alter our prior analyses. Sea surface
temperature (SST) data have undergone greater chan-
ges in recent years, but SST data are not employed in
our present study.
Large warming in 2005–2015 exists not only in the
Mediterranean,Middle-East, Sahara region but also in
the Gobi Desert and Southwest United States. Ampli-
fied warming in desert regions (Cook and Vizy 2015)
and a tendency for increasing heatwaves and strong
droughts to coincide (Mazdiyasni and Agha-
Kouchak 2015) are expected consequences of
increased global warming. Generally, as global warm-
ing increases, climatologically wet regions tend to get
Figure 3. Shifting bell curves that define the frequency of local temperature anomalies relative to the 1951–1980 base period for four
regions, with definitions and nomenclature as infigure 1.
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wetter and dry regions get hotter and drier (figure 2.33
in IPCC 2013). Polar amplification of surface warming
is also apparent (figure 4), but that warming occurs
where interannual climate variabitily is very large, so
the signal-to-noise ratio and bell curve shifts are smal-
ler at high latitudes.
Next, based on available peer-reviewed studies, we
briefly review practical impacts expected to result
from the shifting temperature bell curves discussed
above.
Livlihoods are affected by higher temperature and
associated absolute humidity, especially at latitudes
with conditions already near the tolerance limit for
outdoor work, as more than half of non-household
labor-hours occur outdoors (ILO 2013, IPCC 2014,
section 13.2). Developing countries in the tropics
are affected disproportionately (Dunne et al 2013,
Kjellstrom et al 2013, Lundgren et al 2013), but work-
ers in places such as southern United States and east-
ern China are also affected by increasing temperature
and absolute humidity (Luginbuhl et al 2008).
Human health is affected by higher temperature
via impacts on heat waves, drought, fires, floods and
storms, and indirectly by ecological disruptions
brought on by climate change including shifting pat-
terns of disease (Lafferty 2009, Altizer et al 2013,
IPCC 2014, ch 11). Vector-borne diseases, usually
involving infections transmitted by blood-sucking
mosquitoes or ticks, are sensitive to changing climate
(IPCC 2014, section 11.5). Other factors will affect
future disease incidence, but it can be concluded that
higher temperatures allow the spread of some disease
vectors to greater altitudes and higher latitudes
(IPCC 2014, section 11.5).
National responsibilities for global warming can
be assigned under the premise that fossil fuel CO2
emissions are the primary issue for long-term warm-
ing. Deforestation and agricultural activities also con-
tribute to atmospheric CO2, but potential restoration
of carbon into the soil and biosphere has comparable
magnitude; indeed, assumption of such restoration via
improved agricultural and forestry practices,
Figure 4. Surface air temperature anomalies in 2005–2015 relative to base period 1951–1980.
Figure 5. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions by source in 2014 and cumulative 1751–2014. Results are an update of figure 10 ofHansen et al
(2013b) using data of Boden et al (2015) andBP (2015).
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including reforestation of lands that are of marginal
value for crops, seems required if climate is to be stabi-
lized at a level close to theHolocene temperature range
(Hansen et al 2008, National Research Council 2015).
In contrast, carbon released in fossil fuel burning will
not be naturally removed from the climate system for
millennia (Archer 2005, IPCC 2013, ch 6). CH4, N2O,
O3 and other gases also contribute to human-made
climate change, but CO2 contributes about 80% of the
increase of GHG climate forcing in the past two dec-
ades (see figure 5 of Hansen et al 2013d) and much of
the increase of the other 20% is related to fossil fuel
mining or fossil fuel use.
Current fossil fuel CO2 emissions are shown in
figure 5(a). China is the largest source of current emis-
sions, with the United States second and India a
rapidly growing third. However, climate change is
accurately proportional to cumulative emissions
(Hansen et al 2007, Matthews et al 2009), shown
in figure 5(b). The United States and Europe,
including their portions of air and ship emissions, are
each responsible for more than one-quarter of the
climate change, China about 10% and India about
3%. Consumption-based accounting for emissions
(Peters 2008) increases this disparity between devel-
oped and developing country emissions.
Per capita fossil fuel emissions (figure 6(a)) and
cumulative emissions (figure 6(b)) provide a useful
perspective on emission responsibilities. Despite Chi-
na’s high current emissions, on a per capita basis they
remain lower than many western nations, and slightly
larger than the global average. Cumulative per capita
emissions by China are an order of magnitude smaller
than US emissions, and India’s cumulative per capita
emissions are even smaller.
Results similar to figures 5 and 6 have been repor-
ted many places. Our figures, available at www.
columbia.edu/~mhs119/CO2Emissions/, are nor-
mally updated annually using indicated sources.
Uncertainties in Chinese emissions include probable
overestimate of coal emission factors (Liu et al 2015)
and possible underreeporting of coal use
(Buckley 2015).
There is striking incongruity between locations of
largest climate change and fossil fuel emission sources,
as noted by Diffenbaugh and Scherer (2011) and
Mahlstein et al (2011, 2012). Largest bell curve shift is
in tropical rainforest, South-East Asia, the Sahara and
Sahel (figure 3). Largest temperature shift, in units of
its natural variability, does not necessarily imply lar-
gest impact on local inhabitants. However, the fact
that largest changes occur in places already near the
limits of human heat tolerance suggests that added
heat may be a problem. Fossil fuel emissions from
nations in these areas are very small (Boden et al 2015).
The only nation in these regions with current emis-
sions as large as the global mean (figure 6(a)) is Mal-
yasia, with current per capita emissions of about 2
tonsC/year/person. However, the cumulative emis-
sions from these nations are all very small in compar-
ison with developed nations, with African emissions
even less than that of India (figure 6(b)). In other
words, the nations experiencing the largest change of
prior normal climate bear negligible responsibility for
causing the climate change.
An equally large climate shift is occurring in the
Mediterranean+Middle East region. The large shift
is confined to the lengthening warm season, when
temperatures are already near the limit of human heat
tolerance. At minimum the added heat makes life
more difficult in the summer and reduces productiv-
ity; it also intensifies drought conditions such as those
in Syria in recent years, if not being a principal cause of
the drought (Kelley et al 2015). As for emission
responsibility, unlike most of Africa and South-East
Asia, per capita emissions from the Middle East are
among the largest in the world (figure 6(a)) and the
fastest growing as the price of fossil fuels is kept low in
many countries via government subsidies. Qatar,
Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Ara-
bia have per capita emissions ranging from 12 to 5 tons
of carbon per person per year, all greater than per
capita emissions in the United States (figure 6(a)).
Cumulative emissions per capita by Middle Eastern
nations are not as large as in countries that developed
earlier, but they are larger than the global mean
(figure 6(b)).
The bell curve shifts in 2005–2015 are only about
one-third of the shift that will occur with 2 °C global
warming. (Although warming of land areas in
Figure 6.Per capita fossil fuel CO2 emissions in 2014 and cumulative. Data sources as infigure 5. Results for additional individual
nations are available at www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/CO2Emissions/.
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2005–2015 is ∼0.8 °C, figure 4, global mean warming
is only∼0.6 °C relative to 1951–80; 1951–80 is∼0.3 °C
warmer than pre-industrial, Hansen et al (2010), so
2 °Cwarming above pre-industrial implies 1.7 °C rela-
tive to 1951–1980.) Given the approximate linearity
between mean temperature increase and bell curve
shift, 2 °C global warming would yield a shift of about
six standard deviations during summer in the Medi-
teranean, Middle East, Sahara and Sahel regions and a
similar shift in all seasons in the African Rainforest and
Southeast Asia (figure 3).
Implications of these regional climate shifts are
manifold. We note several consequences, focusing on
their geographically uneven impact, especially the dif-
ference between developing countries at low latitudes
and more developed northern nations. The examples
and not a review of these burgeoning research areas,
but they are sufficient to introduce discussion of rele-
vance of these regional changes to the issue of danger-
ous human-made climate change.
Hsiang et al (2013) assemble the results of 60 quan-
titative studies of the relation between climate change
and human conflict spanning the last 10 000 years and
all major world regions. They find that interpersonal
violence increases by 4% and intergroup conflict by
14% for each standard deviation change in temper-
ature toward warmer temperatures. Such findings do
not constitute natural laws, but they provide a useful
empirical estimate of impacts that can be used for at
least a limited range of temperature increase. Increases
we infer of 2–6 standard deviations with 2 °C global
warming imply significant effects in all regions, but
with larger effects at lower latitudes. Conflicts in turn
tend to result in migrations with effects on both dis-
placed and host populations (McMichael et al 2012).
Temperature rise itself imposes a strong dis-
proportionately large effect on low latitude countries.
Pal and Eltahir (2016) note that business-as-usual fos-
sil fuel emissions result in some regions in the Middle
East becoming practically uninhabitable by the end of
this century as the wet bulb temperature approaches
the level at which the human body is unable to cool
itself under even well-ventilated outdoor conditions
(Sherwood and Huber 2010). Today’s global temper-
ature distribution has notable nonlinear effect on eco-
nomic productivity (Burke et al 2015). Middle latitude
countries have near-optimum temperature and lim-
ited impact from projected temperature change, but,
in contrast, warmer countries, such as Indonesia,
India and Nigeria are on a steep slope with rapidly
declining productivity as temperature rises (figure 2,
Burke et al 2015).
These regional consequences of warming are
accompanied by a threat that sea level rise poses to glo-
bal coastlines, thus jointly creating a need for prompt
strong actions to avoid tragic results. Earth’s history
suggests that warming of even 1 °C above pre-indus-
trial levels could eventually lead to 6–9 m sea level rise
(Dutton et al 2015). IPCC (2013) estimates that about
1 m or less sea level rise would occur by 2100, but
Hansen et al (2015) argue that amplifying feedbacks
make a highly nonlinear response likely with potential
for several meters of sea level rise this century and
recent ice sheet models explore mechanisms that may
contribute to rapid ice sheet collapse (Pollard
et al 2015). If the ocean continues to accumulate heat
and increase melting of marine-terminating ice
shelves of Antarctica and Greenland, a point may be
reached at which it is impossible to avoid large scale ice
sheet disintegration. Given that amajority of large glo-
bal cities are located on coastlines, sea level rise would
add another source ofmigration pressure.
The United Nations 1992 Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) stated its objec-
tive as ‘Kstabilization of GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.
The 15th Conference of the Parties (Copenhagen
Accord 2009) changed the focus to a goal to ‘Kreduce
global emissions so as to hold the increase of global
temperature below 2 °CK’, and the 21st Conference
of the parties added an aspirational goal of below
1.5 °C (Davenport 2015). However, we suggest that
the UNFCCC (1992) objective to stabilize GHG con-
centrations is fundamental and starkly informs policy
requirements.
Atmospheric CO2 amount, in particular, is a great
challenge in limiting GHG concentration. Earth’s
paleoclimate history, especially the sensitivity of sea
level to global temperature (Dutton et al 2015), and
knowledge of Earth’s carbon cycle (Archer 2005,
IPCC 2013, ch 6 ) provide a strong constraint, which
Hansen et al (2008) use to infer that CO2 must be
restored to a level no higher than ∼350 ppm, with
restoration prompt enough to avoid practically irrever-
sible ocean warming and ice sheet disintegration. This
estimate for the CO2 ceiling was affirmed by accurate
measurements of Earth’s present energy imbalance
(Hansen et al 2011, von Schuckmann et al2016).
Restoration of CO2 to a level at or below 350 ppm
within a century, even with optimistic assumptions
about restoration of biospheric and soil carbon, would
require reductions of fossil fuel emissions by 5%–7%
per year if reductions are started promptly (Hansen
et al 2013b). Failure to achieve such reduction will
result in continued long-term energy imbalance with
Earth’s surface and ocean continuing to warm, grow-
ing regional climate impacts, accelerating ice sheet dis-
integration, and more rapidly rising sea level. As
evidence of the situation and consequences grows,
there may be increasing calls for climate ‘geo-engi-
neering’ (Royal Society 2009) with unknown con-
sequences (Sillmann et al 2015).
Country-by-country goals, the approach of the
21st Conference of the Parties (Davenport 2015), will
not lead to planetary energy balance and climate stabi-
litzation if fossil fuels are the cheapest energy. It is
necessary to include ‘external’ costs to society in the
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fossil fuel price, especially the costs of climate change
and air and water pollution (Ackerman and Stan-
ton 2012), so that carbon-free energies and energy effi-
ciency can supplant fossil fuels more rapidly. Such
inclusive pricing of fossil fuels makes economies more
efficient and reduces net economic hardships, if the
carbon fee, collected from fossil fuel companies at
domestic mines and ports of entry, rises gradually and
if the funds are distributed uniformly to the public
(Hansen 2015).
A carbon fee can be initiated by a few major eco-
nomic powers and spread to most nations via border
duties on fossil-fuel-derived products from non-parti-
cipating nations and fee rebates to domestic manu-
facturers for goods shipped to non-participating
nations (Hsu 2011). Issues raised by ‘coercive coopera-
tion’ implicit in border adjustments (Bohringer
et al 2012) will be subdued, once the severity and
urgency of the climate threat is widely appreciated, by
realization that fossil fuels cannot be phased out if
some countries are allowed to export products made
with untaxed fossil fuels. Developing countries have
rights, recognized in the concept of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities, and leverage to achieve
economic assistance, which should be tied to the
improved agricultural and forestry practices needed to
limit trace gas emissions and store more carbon in the
soil and biosphere. Finally, international cooperation
in generating more affordable carbon-free energies is
needed, or economic development in many nations
will continue to be based on fossil fuels, despite pollu-
tion and climate impacts.
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